Abstract-This research contributes to the lifecycle assessment of complex cyber-physical systems (CCPSs) to better understand and mitigate risks of malicious attacks through design. This assessment capability is proposed during the early phase of engineering design where significant decision-making flexibility exists. This is done by assessing potential malicious attacks carried out by humans interacting with the system across all phases of the system's lifecycle. We propose a novel quantification of an attacker-centric risk, then optimize the large set of attacks using a genetic algorithm. This research is motivated by the increased vulnerability of CCPSs due to their increasingly complex interconnected and digitally connected nature. A specific area of interest for CCPSs has been the increasing degree of connectedness. For example, several recent federal reports indicate that significant risk exists in the design of commercial aircraft where the entertainment system is connected to the avionics through a central network. The result is an increased ability to attack a specific subsystem or component to produce system failure. These findings, as well as others, have led to a significant concern with malicious attacks to target critical components of the CCPS. While assessments can be performed on a CCPS during the later phases of engineering design, techniques are currently not available during the early phase. We propose an assessment technique which is useful to practitioners during conceptual design. In this research, we assess a nuclear power plant as an example CCPS. The resulting methodology provides useful insight to the risks of malicious attacks throughout the system's lifecycle.
I. INTRODUCTION
The nature of many historical failures in complex cyber physical systems (CCPS) can be attributed to component failures. As systems have become more complex and highly integrated, their reliability has changed. As such, modern systems have reliability characteristics more related to the integration of parts, unknown impacts from the environment, and human-related failures than component-driven reliability. Humans, especially during emergency situations, have been a major contributor to many of the most detrimental failures in nuclear power plants [1] - [4] .
As a subset of human-related failures, malicious attacks and sabotage events are a growing concern. These attacks are typically viewed as low probability events; however, they are often specifically designed to inflict the largest amount of damage on the system. As a result, the consequence of these attacks presents a major concern for CCPSs. Further, within the context of decision making (i.e., deciding to attack a system), malicious attacks might initially appear to be random. However, the perception that an attacker's behavior is irrational is within the greater context of society. The issue with this thinking is that society doesn't make the decision to attack a system, the individual attacker does. Thus, the decision becomes driven by the elements later outlined in this paper.
CCPSs have an especially high level of vulnerability to cyber and physical malicious attacks. This idea can be understood by considering the connectivity of a nuclear power plant where there are a significant number of controlled components, measurement devices used in automated decision making, and sensors for measuring and logging data. Further, CCPSs often have many physical components controlled by cyber components, all of which are vulnerable to a cyber attack [5] , [6] . The result is a large degree of vulnerability for components to be accessed and used to control elements of the system. From a design assessment perspective, malicious attacks are disregarded by traditional reliability techniques. Probabilistic reliability predictions cannot be used for attacks. Such methods are unable to consider intentional attacks due to a lack of data used to develop predictive techniques. While probability of occurrence is a facet of risk, failures with extremely high risk are mitigated regardless of their probability. Further, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and related methods are used to assess risk; however, these methods focus on single-point failures. It is well known that many historical, catastrophic failure events have occurred as a result of multiple failure scenarios [7] . For malicious attacks, the goal is to inflict maximal damage, and therefore it is reasonable to consider multiple-failure (i.e., multiple attack) scenarios. As a result, FMEA style analyses are not well suited for malicious attacks.
Further, traditional reliability techniques are not applicable during the early phases of engineering design. It has been shown that early design offers a significant amount of decision making freedom. Specifically, decisions can be made that have significant and fundamental impact to the system design. This is demonstrated in a report by GOA where 10 Department of Defense (DoD) programs were compared [8] . The report concluded that early design rigor provides clear advantages toward the success of designing complex systems. Additionally, due to cost and schedule concerns, changing the system's design late in the design cycle is often regarded as unfeasible.
The specific contribution of this research is the development an early design framework capable of identifying highrisk malicious attacks against CCPSs. We do this by identifying attacks specifically by their lifecycle phase, and then by assessing each attack for its likelihood and consequence. The likelihood metric proposed in this research is from the perspective of the attacker. A genetic algorithm (GA) is used to optimize the attack scenarios to identify high-risk attacks.
II. RELATED RESEARCH
Functional block diagrams (FBDs) are used to model the network of connections between a system's functions and flows during conceptual design. An important element of functional block diagrams is the language used, which is described in the hierarchical Functional Basis [9] . The common language introduced in the Functional Basis allows a designer to leverage design methods and automation techniques which is a significant thrust in current research for functional design. Such techniques are described in [10] - [12] as they relate to assessing failures. These techniques have broadened the capability of failure analysis by allowing designers to evaluate the functionality of a system prior to formal architecture being defined. While these methods encourage the early discovery of failures, they are unable to address the effect of such failures. Kurtoglu and Tumer develop a method to assess a system once its basic architecture is understood [13] . This is done by propagating failures through the system and results in an analysis of the system's functional health. In this case, failures propagate through the system and not the environment nor through parts of the system that are not modeled. Work by Sierla et al. models failure propagation between the system and the surrounding environment [14] while work by O'Halloran et al. models failure propagation across uncoupled boundaries [15] . These advances in failure propagation investigate wellunderstood failure events in the system. The proposed method in this research is used to investigate malicious attacks, which are not equivalent to failures initiated by random events. We define malicious attacks as being premeditated failures originated by humans. As such, malicious attacks are initiated by an attacker's intent to disrupt the system. While the attacker's decision to attack the system is random, how they carry out the attack is not. The probability values identified in this research are subsequent to an attacker deciding to attack the system. Work has been done to classify and understand the identification and detection of malicious attacks [16] . In particular the summary classification presented here [17] is instructive. While detection systems require some level of understanding of the attack effect, they are not well suited to evaluate the full effect of the attack and therefore do not address our research need.
A significant amount of work has focused on the evaluation of attacks in CCPSs. Holmes et al. investigate attacks on highly networked systems by removing nodes and edges [18] . They define and apply four attack categories to six different network types and determine that network structure significantly changes based on the removal of nodes and edges. Motter and Lai demonstrate an approach to cascade attacks through highly networked systems [19] . They show that eliminating a single key node in the network model can cause a local or global failure. While this is true in their study, this is a special case and is only applicable for systems that contain high heterogeneity. In many complex systems including those with a highly networked architecture, subsystem redundancy with dissimilar parts is common. Sole et al. explore the fragility of the European power grid to intentional attacks [20] . Mean field analysis is used to demonstrate the relative increase in risk between attacks and random failures. The majority of this work is concerned with highly networked systems (e.g., power grids, social media, internet, transportation systems, etc.). Research indicates that highly networked system exhibit a high vulnerability; however, CCPSs that do not have a network dominated architecture suffer from the same issue. While CCPSs contain network vulnerability, they are often not modeled using a highly networked approach. Further, these methods do not model the behavioral effect of the system or address mitigation of the attack.
A major limitation to most of the research mentioned above is its applicability to the nuclear power plant system being modeled in this paper. Most research interested in malicious attacks on CCPSs is modelled using network techniques and not physics-based models. As such, the removal of a node or edge is similar to the complete removal of a component. Removing a node or edge terminates all flows through the component. However, this approach does not realistically model the way systems fail. In a propagated failure, which results from an initial attack, the failure can propagate to other components and only slightly affect their behavior. The aggregate effect across the entire system is the consequence of the initial failure, which when generalized is comprised of a combination of some complete and some degraded component failure states. In the research presented below, this is modeled through the mathematics of the physics-based model. Even still, malicious attacks can propagate across uncoupled boundaries where the boundaries are not traditionally captured in the simulation model. Further, affectual attacks that only slightly disrupt a part's performance are a known attack method [21] . Thus, existing research has not addressed these types of failures.
An approach by Celle et al. presents a failure propagation model in networks [22] . Their approach considers nodes in a network as susceptible, infected, or disabled. This allows a network to be modeled beyond the pure failed/functional view of nodes. However, this work in not capable of reasoning about the physics of the system. Cardenas et al. develop an approach to detect a malicious attack, quantify its consequence, and then propose a design resilience algorithm to avoid the consequence [23] . This approach does not consider the propagation of failures once the initial attack occurs, which is a fundamental tenant in complex systems. Additionally, this method does not quantify the likelihood of an attack.
In summary, current research on malicious attacks in systems has focused on network-based. Within this existing work, failure propagation is modeled at a very basic level of fidelity, if at all. The authors see this limitation as a clear need to more accurately model the system and its ability to propagate failures. To accomplish this, malicious attacks are modeled in the system, and are allowed to propagate once they have been initiated. A physics-based simulator is used to accurately model the failure propagation as well as the system. In addition, a genetic algorithm is used to intelligently search the attack space and find the optimal attack.
III. METHODOLOGY
To address the limitations in existing research, the research presented in this paper focuses on several facets of malicious attacks. First, risk is defined using a standard form, which is shown in Equation 1. Second, assessment of the attack likelihood is defined from the attacker's perspective. In this case, we do not model this value as probabilistic. Instead, likelihood is estimated based on notional factors used by the attacker to perceive the effectiveness of the attack. Third, consequence is modeled as the amount of functional health lost to the system by a specific attack. The likelihood and consequence are combined to quantify the risk of an attack. Forth, a genetic algorithm is used to optimize the attack space for the highest risk attack scenario. Given the complexity of the attack space, exhaustive exploration is infeasible. Finally, we build each attack scenario using six individual attacks, which are inspired by the system's lifecycle. Unlike traditional risk analysis, attacks are deliberate and seek to inflict maximal damage. As a result, multiple attacks offer attackers a higher consequence and are therefore prioritized.
The method presented in this research is used to assess systems that are in the conceptual stage of engineering design. By applying this method to a specific system, the risk of malicious attacks can be assessed quantitatively. The risk assessment can then be used to guide system design decisions to reduce or mitigate potential malicious attack avenues.
The flowchart in Figure 1 represents the step-by-step process to execute the proposed method. The method is used to iterate the design until known risks are at an acceptable level. While the method does mandate iterating on the design, the research presented here explicitly does not identify how to improve the design. Instead, the method provides the risk of an attack in combination with the specific attack scenario. Then a design engineer can identify a suitable design change to mitigate specific attack scenarios. As a result, the method includes the risk acceptable decision point as a best practice for engineering design.
Relative to this research, the flowchart in Figure 1 steps a designer through assessing the risk of coordinated attacks across all lifecycle phases. It is important to note that the assessment does not occur during each lifecycle phase. Instead, the method assesses malicious attacks from various lifecycle phases. As the flowchart shows, the quantification of risk is dependent on the lifecycle phase. For example, attacks that occur in design can be different than those that occur in operation. Further, the vulnerability of a component or subsystem changes across the various lifecycle phases. The quantification of the risk factors change for each lifecycle phase. Table I lists some of the attacks in each lifecycle that are investigated in this research.
In the subsequent subsection, explanations are provided for all steps presented in Figure 1 including the models used in 
Design Models
The development of conceptual design models has become an established step in the systems engineering design process. The research presented here uses several types of models to represent the system during conceptual design. The case study presented in the subsequent section provides example models that are representative of the types of models often used in systems engineering.
The first two models used in the case study presented with this methodology include the functional block diagram (FBD) [24] and a configuration flow graph (CFG) [13] . The FBD describes the network of connections between a system's functions and flows. A FBD defines the design intent of a system; however, it does not indicate how the function is accomplished. This is captured by the CFG. The CFG is the physical architecture model of the system. The FBD and CFG are connected by the definition that a component implements a function. Thus, information is shareable between the two models. For both the FBD and CFG, a system boundary delineates the border between the functions or components that are included in the system and those that are not. External flows cross the system boundary and are acted on by functions or components within the system, and vice versa. Specification of a system boundary produces the desired set of output flows and also the appropriate set of flow conversions inside the system boundary. Together the FBD and CFG are combined and used in the Functional Failure Identification Propagation framework to assess the consequence of an attack. This approach is described in [25] , and is not a contribution of this research.
Another model used in this research describes the behavior of the system mathematically [26] . This model is executable using simulation packages. The fidelity level captured in the model will affect the results of the method presented here; however we do not provide insight or guidance into the recommended level of fidelity. This characteristic is primarily determined by the design process, and therefore has limited flexibility.
Genetic Algorithms
Genetic algorithms (GAs) are a generic class of stochastic algorithms used for optimization [27] . GAs are specifically well suited for problems that are inherently complex where the solution space is large and unknown. The nature of complex system models is that each simulation is time-intensive. In the research presented here, the combination of attacked components relative to the size of the system makes an exhaustive simulation approach unfeasible. Therefore, GAs offer an alternative to how the optimization searches the attack space.
GAs have several elements including chromosomes and genes, generations of chromosomes, a fitness function, and additional fitness function coefficient parameters. Humans are the mechanism in the system that initiate a malicious attack. More specifically, we model each component's access points (attack locations) and the associated attacks that can be inflicted by a human. In the GA, these values are represented as the genes. Genes are individual elements that make up a chromosome, and therefore each chromosome represents an attack scenario. Chromosomes are the input to the system's simulation model. The simulation model produces a consequence value for each chromosome. In addition, a likelihood value is estimated for each chromosome (see consequence and likelihood in the subsequent section for implementation details). The result for each chromosome is a risk value which quantifies the attack value for the chromosome.
A set of chromosomes make up a population. In GAs, a population represents the potential breeding pool. More specifically, the highest ranking chromosomes are allowed to mutate while the lowest are eliminated. The amount that are allowed to breed is a parameter of the GA, which as a baseline we use a value of 50%. The process to mutate is a random selection of genes from well-performing chromosome with the goal to produce a better-performing offspring.
In the following subsections, descriptions are provided on specific elements of the GA used in this research.
Fitness Function:
The fitness function used in this research is an assessment of risk, which combines attack consequence and likelihood (see Equation 2) . The values for consequence and likelihood are estimates, and are defined in the following ways.
Consequence: In this paper we define the consequence as the amount of functional health suffered by the system, or the delta between it's nominal performance values and it's performance values in the presence of a failure. Some attacks can result in a system failure while others result in a degraded system state. One approach to quantifying the consequence is to classify the attack as a system failure or a degraded system. However, this omits the possibility that the system entered a degraded state. In this research the consequence is defined as a departure from the nominal state. This approach is described in prior work [25] . For each function (e.g., Convert Solid Material to Radioactive Energy -Transmit Thermal Energy, Regulate Pressure Energy, and Convert Liquid Material to Gas Material), consequence is defined as the summation of the individual deviations from the nominal state for each function. For example, if an attack increases the fuel rod temperature in a nuclear power plant by 75 degrees Celsius, and the nominal state is 700 degrees Celsius, the result is a 10.7% increase in fuel temperature. This approach is used for all functions and each functional health deviation is summed to achieve the final consequence value (see Equation 3 ). In this equation, i represents the function and the terms Failed and Nominal represent the function's parametric value being measured.
Likelihood: In this research, we assert that the likelihood of an attack is poorly modeled using probabilistic models. The likelihood of an attack is purely a choice made by the attacker. Further, humans make decisions based on their perception of the most important factors [28] . As a result, likelihood is defined based on perceived factors determined by the attacker. This is labeled by the attack success coefficient (ASC), and modeled using Equation 4 .
Ease of Attack (EOA): The Ease of Attack (EOA) is an estimate for how likely the attack is to be successfully initiated. This estimate does not guarantee that the attack will be successful; attacks can be eliminated midway through execution if they are detectable. Instead, this value is used to estimate the likelihood that the attack can be successfully launched. As an example, virus attacks sent through company email are likely to have a higher EOA than a physical attack inside a facility that has a physical security system around the perimeter.
Degree of Stealth (DOS):
The Degree of Stealth (DOS) is an estimate of the attack's ability to be executed without being noticed. While the attacker is concerned with inflicting damage to the system, maintaining a high degree of stealth allows the attacker to achieve a greater variety and number of attacks. For systems that are well monitored (industrial processes, consumer vehicles, etc.), a trade-off exists between the DOS and achieving a high consequence. Other types of attacks such as data exploits take place over long periods of time and naturally rely heavily on stealth. Several aspects can impact the stealth of an attack including length of the attack, location of attack, and the attack's effect on the system.
Perceived Impact/Consequence (PIC):
The Perceived Impact/Consequence (PIC) is an estimate of the attack's outcome toward reaching the attack desired consequence. As an example, attacks can be used to acquire data or to inflict damage to the system. While the proposed method quantifies an attack's consequence separately from this value, the PIC is the attacker's perception of the consequence and clearly contributed toward their decision to select a specific attack.
Location Parameter (LP):
The Location Parameter (LP) defines the number of locations required to implement the attack. Given the increased complexity of more locations, the quantification of an attack is decremented. Alternatively, less locations are scored with a higher LP value.
In this paper we do not claim to present a method to generate a realistic estimation of the EOA, PIC, and DOS parameters. Practitioners can adapt these parameters and add more to fit the system under assessment and define them for each lifecycle phase. In the research we adopt a simplistic approach for estimating the EOA, PIC, and DOS parameters for the purpose of demonstrating the method. The purpose of this research is to present the method rather than to provide industry-specific and design-specific guidance on generating realistic estimates of EOA, PIC, and DOS.
In summary, the methodology presented in the research is used to assess a system's risk of malicious attacks. Attacks are inspired from each major lifecycle phase. Further, the attack's value is related to the attacker's perception of the attack's impact. A GA is used to systematically search the attack space and to identify the attack with the most significant impact to system risk.
IV. CASE STUDY, RESULTS, AND DISCUSSION
In the case study, we demonstrate the application of the methodology presented in Figure 1 . We use the example of a primary cooling circuit in a generic nuclear power plant. A version of the FBD and CFG are shown in Figure 2 . Figure   2 represents the two models together as a hybrid model since the functions and components share a 1-to-1 relationship at the model's current level of fidelity. In the FBD, three functions are assessed including Regulate Pressure Energy, Convert Solid Material to Radioactive Energy -Transmit Thermal Energy, and Convert Liquid Material to Gas Material. The system in this case study is simulated to understand the functional impact of the system. This simulation is buried within the "Run Genetic Algorithm" box of Figure 1 . The plant simulation model is built in APROS 6. This model has been accepted by safety authorities for design analysis for several nuclear plants in Finland, Sweden, Russia, and Hungary [29] . The model includes components such as a reactor, pressurizer, steam generator, pumps, pipes, valves, etc. There are six primary circuit pipelines, half on each side of the reactor. Each leg of the primary circuit has a steam generator. The steam from the secondary circuit side of the steam generators is combined by a steam collector component into a single pipeline leading to the turbine. This element is not shown in Figure 3 . Further, Figure 3 is one of fourteen process diagrams and forty four automation diagrams included in the simulation model.
From Figure 1 , values of EOA, DOS, and PIC, used to "Quantify attack likelihood", are each given a baseline value of 0.333. For a particular subsystem, each parameter was increased or decreased based on knowledge of the generic nuclear power plant system. For example, the primary circuit and the emergency subsystems are harder than average to attack (-EOA, -DOS), however, these have high perceived impact value (+PIC). When all attack points are located in two or fewer subsystems, the EOA and DOS are doubled. When all attack points are located in three or more subsystems, then the EOA and DOS are halved. The security coefficient parameters are displayed in Table II. For comparison purposes, the fitness function of the GA used three configurations. This comparison highlights the relative difference in risk when the method is being employed. RunA considered only simulated impact to the plant as presented in previous work [25] . In this case, the likelihood value is set to 0.333 for all attacks, and is agnostic to the number of locations attacked (i.e., LP=1). While security coefficient values of 0.333 are not practical, since in reality a location must be chosen before an attack is implemented, they represent a theoretical and mathematical baseline for comparison against the methodology proposed in this paper. RunB includes RunA in addition to the location of the attack, and thus uses the values from Table II for the security coefficient parameters. However, RunB does not implement the number of attack locations (i.e., LP=1). RunC builds on RunB by incorporating the total number of locations in the attack scenario.
The GA had a population size of 128 chromosomes with ten generations. Every chromosome contains 6 genes, one for each attack. The attack points are related to approximately 100 automation components across the subsystems of the plant which have 3 attack variations each. Table IV presents the top 5 scenarios of the final generation produced by the GA with the fitness function configurations RunA, RunB, RunC.
The three fitness function configurations result in very different scenarios in the top 5 shown in Table IV . In RunA, the scenarios are located in a large number of plant subsystems (5 or 6) and the simulated impact score is relatively high (i.e., approximately 5000). In RunB, subsystems that have a higher security coefficient also have a higher risk. The scenarios RESULTS FOR THE TOP FIVE ATTACK SCENARIOS APPLIED TO THE GENERIC NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (NPP) contain less locations (3 to 4) and the simulated impact to the plant was even higher than RunA at approximately 8000. This can be explained by the random components of the GA (e.g., random starting population, mutations, etc.). RunC resulted in scenarios with attacks in only two locations in the plant, while the simulated impact scores varied from 2500 to 5000). It should be noted that the impact scores are useful for relative comparison between the runs but does not correspond directly to a risk of occurrence.
V. CONCLUSION
A major element of designing CCPSs is the consideration of critical failures. In the nuclear power industry, many of these have been realized throughout history [1] - [4] . One type of critical failure is malicious attacks where a deliberate attack is inflicted on a system to achieve a desired negative consequence. While researchers have developed methods to address various aspects of malicious attacks, research to date has not addressed important considerations such as completing a detailed exploration of the attack space, defining the likelihood of an attack based on the attacker, propagating failures once the attack occurs, and considering multiple attacks simultaneously.
In this research we address these limitation through the development of a novel method. The method presented in Figure 1 is used to quantify risk for malicious attacks. Exploration of the attack space is accomplished using a genetic algorithm (GA). Inputs to the GA are estimated based on notional parameters perceived by the attacker. In combination with prior work to quantify the consequence of an attack, the risk of an attack is modeled. The GA is then used to identify the worst-case attack.
FUTURE WORK
Attack trees, similar to fault trees, are used to identify sets of aggregated attacks that lead to top-level undesirable system effects [30] . In future work we will expand the method presented in this research to generate attack trees. Similar to fault tree, the development of attack trees relies on an expert to understand the elaborate combinations of attack cause and effect, and how those relate to a set of top-level undesirable system effects. Using a risk-based approach in combination with a GA will allow attack trees to be automatically developed. Further, this proposed future approach allows the focus to remain on the undesirable effect, whereas the method presented in the paper is concerned more with identifying that effect of an attack.
